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Human Rights, Sex, and Gender: 
Limits in Theory and Practice 
 
Lara Stemple* 
 
At the Pace Law Review Symposium entitled After Gender: 
Examining International Justice Enterprises, I was delighted to 
participate on one of the four panel “conversations” along with 
Bridget Crawford (Pace), Suzanne Goldberg (Columbia), Scott 
Long (Harvard), and Carole Vance (Columbia). Refreshingly, 
rather than the typical fifteen-minute panel presentations, 
panelists were invited to converse around a theme; some of us 
spoke beforehand, together with organizers Darren Rosenblum 
(Pace) and Janet Halley (Harvard), to map out the directions 
our conversation might take. Our panel’s theme was christened 
Human Rights Beyond Sex and Gender. 
As I reflect on the unfolding of that conversation, it occurs 
to me that a more accurate though surely less snappy title 
would have been “Human Rights Beyond Sex and Gender as 
Currently Rendered in International Lawmaking.” In my view, 
a project no less ambitious than the development of a body of 
international human rights law applicable to all people 
demands thoughtful consideration of gender. The problem is 
that when lawmaking pen has finally met paper, the outcome 
has been distressingly limited. 
I focus my comments here on the role of sexual violence in 
international law, both because it is a topic on which my 
advocacy practice has focused, and because sexual violence 
represents the central issue around which women-focused 
international law-making has coalesced in recent decades.1 
My theoretical interest in issues concerning gender and 
sexual violence originates from my practical experience as a 
 
  * Director of Graduate Studies and Director of the Health and Human 
Rights Law Project at UCLA School of Law.  
1. See Alice M. Miller, Sexuality, Violence Against Women, and Human 
Rights: Women Make Demands and Ladies Get Protection, 7 HEALTH & HUM. 
RTS., no. 2, 2004 at 16.  
1
2011] HUMAN RIGHTS, SEX, AND GENDER 825 
 
human rights lawyer. Working for different women’s rights 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), I routinely employed 
a range of international human rights instruments as tools to 
advocate against the sexual and reproductive subordination of 
women and girls. Later, I served as the director of the human 
rights organization Just Detention International (JDI), which 
works to end sexual violence in prisons, jails, and immigration 
detention. Because approximately 91 percent of prisoners are 
men,2 I moved from advocacy concerning issues affecting 
mostly women to advocacy concerning an issue affecting mostly 
men. In so doing, I was struck by how few tools were at my 
disposal when the victims of sexual abuse were male. 
Indeed, the instruments that address sexual violence the 
most comprehensively exclude men. Beyond the limited utility 
of the instruments, I found that this sex-based framing 
reinforced an us-versus-them dualism that was generally 
useless and frequently counterproductive. Men’s rights 
advocates latched on to messages about prisoner rape as proof 
that feminists were wrong about rape. Likewise, some 
feminists at rape crisis centers were at first openly resistant to 
serving male prisoner rape victims. Gender nonconforming 
people, who are frequently victimized in prisons, did not fit 
comfortably within the essentialist two-sex binary presented in 
the instruments. 
Instead of belonging to any one constituency, the 
phenomenon of rape is instead part of a larger whole, related, 
of course, to the exercise of domination, the violation of bodily 
integrity, and the subjugation of its victims. And, yes, rape is 
almost always about gender, which is not to say it is always 
about women. 
Feminist approaches that value equality and inclusion, 
that interrogate structural hierarchies, and that examine 
intersecting forms of oppression have proved useful. Other 
“feminist” approaches resting upon a women-versus-men 
 
2. World Prison Brief, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country=190 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2011). Just Detention International now works in 
multiple countries, but when I worked there it was focused only on the 
United States. This is therefore U.S. data. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/5
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perspective have been untenable; ideology too often trumps 
evidence, and alternative perspectives seem unwelcome. 
Neither I nor most scholars who seek to challenge the sex-
based certainties embedded in international law advocate for 
an erasure of gender considerations. Undoing rape requires 
thorough attention to gender it all its forms. But despite 
assurances like these, advocate friends and law students I 
teach who are exposed to the academic literature critical of 
current approaches often fret that the critiques threaten to 
undo hard-won progress by women’s rights movements. 
Others ask, quite rightly, how movements for 
transformative gender change can ever describe inequality 
(“women are victims”) without re-inscribing sex-based 
stereotypes (“women are victims”). It simply cannot be that all 
advocacy for gender equality actually reinforces women’s 
inequality. The problem lies not with the advocacy per se, but 
with the approach as currently articulated in international law. 
International law’s approach to violence against women 
has been problematized by many at the Symposium, including 
but not limited to these participants: Karen Engle has 
questioned “the assumption that women who have been raped 
in wartime have been destroyed.”3 Ratna Kapur has argued 
that “victimization rhetoric has reinforced an imperialist 
response toward women in the developing world” by 
representing them “as thoroughly disempowered, brutalized, 
and victimized: a representation that is far from liberating for 
women.”4 Carole Vance and Alice Miller have argued that the 
preference for “innocent” victims stems from the desire to 
create appealing advocacy messages, but risks leaving other 
victims out, serving to reinforce hierarchical norms of sexual 
privilege.5 
I hope to contribute to this ongoing dialogue my own 
concerns about the problematic practical and theoretical 
 
3. Karen Engle, Judging Sex in War, 106 MICH. L. REV. 941, 942 (2008). 
4. Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the 
“Native” Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 18 (2002). 
5. Alice M. Miller & Carole S. Vance, Sexuality, Human Rights, and 
Health, 7 HEALTH & HUM. RTS., no. 2, 2004 at 5, 11. 
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implications of the body of international law which assumes 
that sexual violence is something that befalls only women and 
girls. Below, I discuss four limitations inherent in the current 
approach. 
 
I. Conflating the Terms “Gender” and “Women” 
 
To the extent that we wish to acknowledge the limitations 
of identity categories while nevertheless deploying them 
strategically to advance equality-oriented rights claiming, as 
Suzanne Goldberg described on our panel, we need, at the very 
least, working definitions that are not nonsensical. We cannot 
move “beyond sex and gender” before arriving at the difference 
between sex and gender.6 
In the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women’s General Recommendation 19, 
for example, “gender based violence” is “violence that is 
directed against a woman, because she is a woman, or that 
affects women disproportionately.”7 No room is left for 
gendered violence that harms men, a glaring omission 
considering that male victims of sexual violence are routinely 
feminized, while their perpetrators maintain a dominant, 
masculinized role. As I have explored in detail elsewhere, the 
human rights cannon repeatedly conflates sex and gender, 
thereby limiting state accountability to acts of gender-based 
violence against one sex.8 
Meanwhile, international criminal law, specifically in the 
 
6. In the Oxford English Dictionary, “sex” is defined as “[e]ither of the 
two divisions of organic beings distinguished as male and female respectively; 
the males or the females (of a species, etc., esp. of the human race) viewed 
collectively.” 15 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 107 (2d ed. 1989). The Oxford 
English Dictionary states that “gender” in modern, especially feminist use is 
“often intended to emphasize the social and cultural, as opposed to the 
biological, distinctions between the sexes.” 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
428 (2d ed. 1989). 
7. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General 
Recommendation 19: Violence against Women, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (Jan. 29, 
1992). 
8. See Lara Stemple, Male Rape and Human Rights, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
605 (2009). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/5
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form of the Rome Treaty establishing the International 
Criminal Court, set out to define gender for the first time in an 
international treaty. The bland and still confusing result—“two 
sexes, male and female, within the context of society”9 at least 
includes both sexes as well as social context, if only as a 
secondary modifier. Notably, it was women’s rights NGOs that 
attempted to advance a more sophisticated and still quite 
workable definition of gender: “socially constructed differences 
between men and women and the unequal power relationships 
that result.”10 
But human rights law fares worse than international 
criminal law, with gender typically assumed to be something 
relevant only to women and girls. This not only erases 
opportunities to understand gender as relative, but it prohibits 
the application of law to situations that do not follow 
traditional gender scripts. 
The most comprehensive and conscientious United 
Nations’ (UN) definition of gender I have seen is as follows: 
 
Gender: refers to the social attributes and 
opportunities associated with being male and 
female and the relationships between women 
and men and girls and boys, as well as the 
relations between women and those between 
men. These attributes, opportunities and 
relationships are socially constructed and are 
learned through socialization processes. They are 
context/time-specific and changeable. Gender 
determines what is expected, allowed and valued 
in a woman or a man in a given context. In most 
societies there are differences and inequalities 
between women and men in responsibilities 
assigned, activities undertaken, access to and 
control over resources, as well as decision-
 
9. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(3), opened for 
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
10. Pam Spees, Women’s Advocacy in the Creation of the International 
Criminal Court: Changing the Landscapes of Justice and Power, 28 SIGNS: J. 
WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 1243, 1244 n.22 (2003). 
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making opportunities. Gender is part of the 
broader socio-cultural context. Other important 
criteria for socio-cultural analysis include class, 
race, poverty level, ethnic group and age.11 
 
Unfortunately, this definition is currently located on the UN 
Women website, not in a formal instrument. 
 
II. Explicit Exclusion of Male Victims 
 
So-called women’s issues were virtually ignored in the 
early decades of the post-World War II human rights 
movement. In the 1980s and 1990s, when significant attention 
was finally paid to women’s vulnerability to human rights 
violations—not infrequently in the form of anti-rape 
language—men were consequently overlooked. This exclusion 
of men and boys can therefore be understood in its historical 
context, but the continuation of the exclusion runs counter to 
important findings about male victimhood. 
As has been well documented by researchers, men and 
boys have been sexually abused in large numbers in prison 
cells, on battlefields, in church rectories, and elsewhere. Of 
course, varied definitions and methodologies limit ease of 
comparison, but one analysis of 120 prevalence studies 
concluded that 3 percent of men worldwide have been raped in 
their lifetime, as compared to 13 percent of women.12  
One can locate over one hundred uses of the term “violence 
against women”—a definition that of course includes sexual 
violence—in UN treaties, general comments, resolutions, and 
consensus documents.13 Most of these instruments exclude 
men, especially those that insist upon the most comprehensive 
remedies to address sexual abuse. Instruments such as the 
 
11. OSAGI Gender Mainstreaming, UN WOMEN, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions (last visited Aug. 
3, 2011). 
12. See Brian H. Spitzberg, An Analysis of Empirical Estimates of Sexual 
Aggression Victimization and Perpetration, 14 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 241, 245 
(1999). 
13. Stemple, supra note 8, at 618 (internal citation omitted). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/5
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2000 Security Council Resolution 1325,14 and the related 
resolutions adopted in the decade that followed, imagine 
wartime sexual violence as a danger irrelevant to men. 
Resolution 1325 was the first of its kind, and it focuses on the 
sexual abuse of “women and girls.” The resolutions that 
followed (1694(2006), 1820(2008), 1888(2009), 1889(2009), 
1960(2010)) were broadened to include “women and children”—
indicating some attention was paid to moving beyond 1325’s 
limitations—but each continued to exclude men. This exclusion 
cannot be squared with evidence, for example, from Liberia, 
which found that 32 percent of male combatants had 
experienced conflict-related sexual violence.15 
A comprehensive gendered analysis of sexual violence has 
much to contribute to our understanding about, for instance, 
why men in prison who are slight, young, and effeminate are 
disproportionately targeted for rape. Such an analysis is 
similarly essential to critiquing the humiliating aims of forced 
fellatio and performative incest during wartime. It is also 
seemingly critical to our understanding of the way in which 
male survivors of sexual abuse often feel emasculated and 
ashamed—with a resulting silence that enables the ongoing 
failure of advocacy groups, the media, and governments to take 
this problem seriously. 
Discomfort with male vulnerability in international 
lawmaking is not limited to sexual violence. When, on behalf of 
a women’s rights NGO, I advocated for attention to women’s 
concerns at the General Assembly Special Session on 
HIV/AIDS in 2001, I was struck by the ease with which 
governments agreed to include our suggested language about 
women.16 Women’s vulnerability, and the validity of addressing 
 
14. S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. SCOR, 4213th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1325 
(2000), available at http://www.unfpa.org/women/docs/res_1325e.pdf. 
15. Forty-two percent of female combatants also reported conflict-related 
sexual violence. Kirsten Johnson et al., Association of Combatant Status and 
Sexual Violence With Health and Mental Health Outcomes in Postconflict 
Liberia, J. AM. MED. ASS’N, http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/300/6/676.full 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2011). 
16. The language pertained to women in general. Groups such as sex 
workers, in contrast, provoked discomfort and were among the vulnerable 
groups state delegates refuse to include in the final instrument by name. 
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it in international lawmaking processes, was by that time no 
longer contested by policymakers. But as I note below, men, 
and in particular those belonging to groups whose vulnerability 
to HIV is well documented, receive no such attention. 
 
III.  Males Viewed Only in Their Instrumentalist Capacity 
 
Women’s rights NGOs can be credited with advancing 
groundbreaking language in international human rights 
instruments that includes men and boys in the context of 
family, reproductive health, and violence, beginning with the 
outcome document developed at the International Conference 
on Population and Development in 1994. As important as this 
language has been, a close reading of this document reveals 
what I have called an “instrumentalist approach”: one that 
includes men and boys only in the context of their 
responsibility to improve women’s and girls’ health and rights. 
While not doubting the importance of addressing the role men 
have to play in the realization of women’s equality, I find the 
approach, when used exclusively, to be problematically narrow. 
For example, the Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS (2006) 
mentions men and boys only once (I safely assume that, 
unfortunately, here as elsewhere, “gender” is used to refer to 
women and girls): 
 
States pledge to eliminate gender 
inequalities, gender based abuse and violence; 
increase the capacity of women and adolescent 
girls to protect themselves from the risk of HIV 
infection and take all necessary measures to 
create an enabling environment for the 
empowerment of women and strengthen their 
economic independence; and in this context, 
reiterate the importance of the role of men and 
boys in achieving gender equality.17 
 
17. Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS, G.A. Res. 60/62, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/262 (June 15, 2006), available at 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2006/20060615_hlm_politicaldeclaration_ar
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/5
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I recognize the benefit of this framing for drawing 
attention to women’s vulnerabilities to HIV, but I find that the 
instrumentalist approach, when used exclusively, fails to 
account for the ways in which gendered norms operate to make 
men susceptible to the disease.18 When healthcare-seeking 
behavior is viewed as a sign of weakness, for example, men 
avoid clinics, and no one wins. 
Moreover, the General Assembly’s refusal to explicitly 
articulate the rights of men who have sex with men in the 
context of HIV/AIDS, despite pressure from NGOs and health 
experts to do so, is discriminatory and dangerous. Silence in 
HIV/AIDS instruments about the real vulnerabilities that some 
men face risks reinforcing notions of men’s invincibility. 
The finger-wagging “should” tone found in instrumentalist 
language also risks turning off men and boys who might be 
open to other, more inclusive messages about the ways in 
which regressive masculinity norms put them in danger. In 
contrast, programs like “One Man Can,” run by Sonke Gender 
Justice in South Africa, frame the engagement of men in 
gender equality efforts as something that empowers and 
benefits them, too. The program asserts that “One Man Can: 
love passionately, stop AIDS, end domestic violence,”19 and so 
on, encouraging men to “to build a movement, to demand 
justice, to claim our rights and to change the world.”20 
In the spirit of Scott Long’s description on our panel of 
human rights law as “creatively norm producing,” can we 
imagine international texts that aim to liberate men and boys 
from the pressure to live up to a masculine ideal? If not, we 
risk remaining stuck with an outdated and unduly limited 
model. 
 
 
 
es60262_en.pdf. 
18. See Jenny A. Higgins et al., Rethinking Gender, Heterosexual Men, 
and Women’s Vulnerability to HIV/AIDS, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 435 (2010). 
19. One Man Can Home, SONKE GENDER JUSTICE, 
http://www.genderjustice.org.za/onemancan/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2011). 
20. Id. 
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IV. Female Perpetrators are Overlooked 
 
Female perpetration of sexual violence is a particularly 
thorny issue for women’s rights advocates to confront, as it 
runs counter to the well-established and politically-potent 
feminist narrative about men’s use of violence to subordinate 
women. This, together with run-of-the-mill gender stereotyping 
to which anti-rape activists are also susceptible, might account 
for its under-exploration in the human rights literature and the 
lack of attention paid to it by human rights NGOs. 
Two data points illustrate the phenomenon of female 
perpetration. The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003,21 for 
which I lobbied together with allies from Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International, and others, calls for an annual survey 
of those held in prison, jail, immigration detention, and 
juvenile detention centers. Among other significant findings, of 
youth reporting forced sexual conduct by an adult staff 
member, 86.1 percent were boys abused by female staff.22 
Elsewhere, a 2010 population-based assessment of sexual 
violence in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
found that, of women who experienced sexual violence as part 
of the long-running DRC conflict, 41 percent reported a female 
perpetrator, most typically a female combatant. 15 percent of 
male victims also reported a female perpetrator. (The study 
was also notable for finding that 22 percent of all men had 
experienced conflict-related sexual violence.) Tellingly, in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) article 
reporting these findings, the authors note, “the term 
interpersonal violence is used in place of gender-based violence 
to include all types of violence between men and women.”23 
Why so? Senior author Lynn Lawry tells me that the 
 
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609 (2006). 
22. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL 
VICTIMIZATION IN JUVENILE FACILITIES REPORTED BY YOUTH 2008-2009, at 13 
(2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svjfry09.pdf. 
23. Kirsten Johnson et al., Association of Sexual Violence and Human 
Rights Violations with Physical and Mental Health in Territories of the 
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 304 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 553, 554 
(2010). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/5
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change was at the behest of JAMA who removed the term 
“sexual gender based violence” during its edits, due to 
confusion between the terms sex and gender. The authors then 
objected in writing, explaining that gender-based violence, an 
internationally accepted phenomenon, “occurs to either men or 
women”; indeed the findings are significant for demonstrating 
exactly this. Nevertheless, the neutered term “interpersonal 
violence” was ultimately used. Lawry concludes that the term 
“gender-based violence” has been “overtaken by advocacy 
groups to push agendas” focused only on male violence against 
women.24 The result of this ongoing narrowness perpetuated by 
advocates, at least in this case, was gender’s partial erasure 
from a study wholly revelatory about gendered violence. 
Interrogating the gender implications of the above findings 
would seem an important feminist project. Do prison and 
military institutions encourage displays of traditional forms of 
masculinity? Do women working as corrections officers or 
acting as combatants face pressure to perform dominance? How 
do males abused by females interpret their own victimization 
and what are the implications, if any, for their propensity for 
future violence or victimization? Erasure of female 
perpetration precludes these explorations. Instead feminism 
would do better to “absorb more holistically the experiences of 
women who would wield strength, aggression, and violence in 
all its forms.”25 
The infamous Abu Ghraib photo of Lynndie England, the 
Army reservist who gave the swaggering “thumbs up” while 
next to a naked, hooded, male detainee forced to masturbate 
before her, certainly has much to say about institutionalized 
gender dominance. Contrary to the dismissive “bad apple” story 
used to explain the behavior of England and her colleagues, 
forced nudity was in fact developed by the U.S. military as an 
interrogation technique and used in Afghanistan, Iraq, and at 
the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba.26 The use of nudity has 
 
24. E-mail from Lynn Lawry to Lara Stemple (Mar. 14, 2011) (on file 
with author). 
25. Jamie R. Abrams, The Collateral Consequences of Masculinizing 
Violence, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703, 704 (2010). 
26. See Anthony R. Jones & George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the 
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been credited with the dehumanization of detainees that set 
the stage for an escalation of degradation.27 And to unpack 
what was really going on, we need tools much more 
sophisticated than international instruments concerned only 
with the sexual violation of women. The torture frame that was 
frequently used also felt limited, missing as it does a gendered 
lens. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
I am sympathetic to concerns about compromising decades 
of work to tell a story about rape as a tool of male dominance 
and female subordination. As Carole Vance observed on our 
panel, the anti-violence against women “establishment,” has 
done important work on an issue of serious concern, creating a 
vested interest in the male perpetrator/female victim narrative. 
It is a narrative that continues to reflect reality for far too 
many people around the world. At the same time, this 
narrative risks obscuring other vectors of gendered oppression 
that are also operating, such as violence against people who fail 
to conform to gender norms. These are competing concerns that 
are difficult, though essential, to keep in balance. 
How to do so? Bridget Crawford asked our panel if we 
would like international human rights instruments to be sex-
neutral. For the reasons laid out above, I oppose sex-specific 
language that is descriptively inaccurate and normatively 
problematic. I am also concerned about the comfort with which 
governments address women’s peril while remaining 
circumspect about the vulnerability of others. I fear that the 
solutions as currently represented in international texts are at 
best only partial and at worst at risk of reinforcing the 
gendered norms they should instead upend. 
But, I do not favor an erasure of gender considerations. I 
favor approaches that focus on empowerment, and that move 
 
Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade 10 
(2005), available at www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2004/intell-
abu-ghraib_ar15-6.pdf. 
27. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/5
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beyond the female victim/male perpetrator focus. I favor 
frameworks that make rights to sexual autonomy, to bodily 
integrity, to dignity, and to inclusive equality paramount. 
Rosalind Petchesky calls sexuality “the matrix of 
universality and a viable exit point”28 to move us beyond the 
exclusive focus on women’s victimization that was politically 
necessary at the moment of Cairo and Beijing. Advocates 
aiming to advance LGBT rights, protect exploited migrant 
workers, end female genital mutilation/cutting, combat 
HIV/AIDS, expand reproductive rights, eradicate prisoner rape, 
and advance the rights of sex workers have much more in 
common in this regard than their organizational silos might 
suggest. 
Collaboration across these movements is do-able and has 
begun to take place in interesting ways in practice.29 
International legal instruments ought not get in the way. 
 
 
28. Rosalind P. Petchesky, Rights of the Body and Perversions of War: 
Sexual Rights and Wrongs Ten Years Past Beijing, 57 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 301, 
306 (2005). 
29. For instance, a coalition of organizations formed the Raising the Bar 
for Justice and Safety Coalition to advocate for the adoption of federal 
standards developed by the Prison Rape Elimination Commission. Among 
others, coalition members include Gay Men’s Health Crisis, National 
Congress of Black Women, Drug Policy Alliance, RAINN (Rape, Abuse and 
Incest National Network), National Minority AIDS Council, Just Detention 
International, Transgender Law Center, and Women's Refugee Commission. 
The full list can be found at http://raisingthebarcoalition.org/members.aspx.  
13
